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Note:  Much of the empirical material for this article was first published in Ronald W. Cox, 
"Corporate Finance and US Foreign Policy," in Ronald W. Cox, ed., Corporate Power and 
Globalization in US Foreign Policy, Routledge Press, pp. 11-30. 
 
Introduction 
 
 The US state has used its power, in concert with sectors of transnational capital, to 
promote the conditions for the growth of a global production system characterized by global 
supply chains and financed by a global network of institutional investors.  The firms located at 
the top of the global supply chain, often referred to as “system integrator firms”, have achieved 
disproportionate power in the US political system that has affected state policy in a number of 
areas, including tax law, trade agreements, and foreign economic policy.  Here I examine the 
conceptual and historical contours of the relationship between transnational firms, the US state 
and the growth of global supply chains.  
 Beginning in the 1970s, corporations based in the US expanded their lobbying networks 
and policy planning organizations to shift policy in a more conservative direction.  A wide body 
of scholarly literature has documented this shift, which resulted in lower taxation, deregulation, 
weakened labor laws and weakened antitrust laws.  Corporations looked to reduce costs in the 
context of increased global competition. Fortune 500 firms were experiencing declining profit 
rates from the mid-1960s through the early 1980s, and sought to reverse these trends by a 
combination of economic and political strategies.  A convergence of events during the 1980s 
allowed some US-based transnational corporations to begin the process of corporate 
restructuring.  This involved a shift from a multidivisional corporate form to a multisubsidiary 
corporate form.  As part of this process, corporations looked to reduce costs by concentrating on 
the most value-added aspects of the production process, including ownership of patents, 
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branding, marketing and distribution of products.  Transnational production strategies shifted 
from ownership and control of production to subcontracting with independent producers or 
creating a subsidiary structure of production that reduces the costs and risks of parent firms.  
Across the Fortune 500, increasingly referred to as the Global 500, corporations at the top of the 
value chain were increasingly selling their corporate divisions that produced products in 
exchange for arms-length relationships with independent supply networks. 
 System integrator firms refer to those transnational corporations that are located at the top 
of global value and supply chains.  Their control of patents, branding, marketing and distribution 
networks give these firms a disproportionate ability to exercise market power relative to firms 
located below them in global supply networks.  The pace of corporate consolidation at the top of 
global supply chains has been accelerated from the 1980s to the present, with mergers and 
acquisitions going through a 4th phase during the 1980s, and another 5th phase that extended from 
the 1990s through the 2000s.  The two most recent waves of mergers and acquisitions differ from 
earlier corporate strategies in that the most powerful transnational firms have used their market 
power to gain control of activities that are the most profitable within a global system of 
production.  Transnational firms based in the US have succeeded in using their political power, 
lobbying networks, and policy planning organizations to weaken US antitrust laws and to 
establish favorable changes in the US tax code that have contributed to global corporate 
restructuring.  The next section examines the roots of the policymaking initiatives advanced by 
transnational corporate interests in the late 1970s and early 1980s that facilitated corporate 
reorganization (Cox, 2012). 
The Long Downturn and Crisis of Fordist Production 
3 
 
 U.S. corporations faced a systemic crisis of profitability that can be measured by falling 
rates of profit of Fortune 500 firms from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. By the mid-1960s, 
corporate profits as a percentage of overall corporate revenue began falling. Another set of 
measurements, revealing the same trend, indicates that corporate profits were falling in relation 
to gross domestic income of the U.S. (Milberg, Winkler 2008: 8). These trends had significant 
effects on both the economic and political activities of corporations in the U.S. 
For U.S. corporations, the traditional approach to maintaining profit rates had been to use 
oligopolistic market power and position to raise prices. This strategy could only be used by firms 
whose market share in a given industry was at a level of concentration that made it cost 
prohibitive for new firms to effectively enter the market and to compete at lower prices. The 
most globally competitive US-based corporations in automobiles, steel, chemicals, and machine 
tools enjoyed such an advantage over their competitors through the immediate post-World War 
II period. This enabled these firms to effectively capture the most dynamic high-value added 
segments of the US market against domestic and foreign competitors for the first two decades 
after WWII. However, by the mid-1960s, there were visible cracks in the oligopolistic structures 
that allowed these firms to dominate the US market.   
Rising competition from Japanese and German exporters, followed by market penetration 
from the newly industrializing countries of Asia, weakened the hold that US-based oligopolies 
had on the US domestic market. The ability of US oligopolistic firms in key industries to raise 
prices to maintain profitability was undercut by the influx of greater foreign competition. 
Furthermore, foreign firms that retooled after WWII had a built-in advantage over their US 
counterparts: they adopted newer technologies that made them more competitive and had a lower 
time horizon of “sunken” costs compared to their US competitors. US firms, having developed 
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their productive assets during the 1930s, had higher pension and medical care obligations than 
their foreign counterparts—a reflection of both the high levels of privatization of these costs in 
the US compared to Europe and the lengthier time horizon for US firms in being obligated to 
these costs. During the first two decades of the post-World War II period, the most globally 
competitive US firms could use their status as “early industrializers” to establish oligopolies that 
dominated the US market in all of the leading sectors of manufacturing. That strategy was 
becoming untenable with the rise of increased global competition. 
U.S. corporations had to look to other strategies in an attempt to overcome the declining 
rate of profit. A convergence of events in the late 1970s and early 1980s led corporations to 
restructure their operations through M @ A strategies that involved buying out, or merging with, 
competitor firms and subsequently shedding assets in a restructuring process designed to focus 
business operations around a core set of activities. This involved a reorganization of the 
corporation around global supply chains in which the highest value added profits accrued to 
corporations at the top of the chain. From the mid-1980s to the present, there has been a greater 
concentration of market share controlled by corporations at the top of the value-added chain of 
production, especially in “the high-technology and/or strongly branded segments of the global 
markets” (Nolan, Zhang, Liu  2007: 23).   This process has coexisted with an increasingly 
complex global production system of small and medium-sized producers and suppliers that 
competes with each other to satisfy the terms of production that are increasingly being 
established by the “system integrators” at the top of the supply chain. The restructuring process 
that began in the 1980s has accelerated to the present, increasingly financed by institutional 
investors through the purchase of corporate shares. This financialization of production has 
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accelerated the pace and scope of global value chains made possible by tremendous 
technological advances and by the liberalization of financial markets throughout the world.   
The US state has played an important role in the establishment of global supply chains 
through a number of mechanisms that will be the focus of the next section of this chapter. First, 
the Reagan Administration during the 1980s was very ideologically supportive and 
accommodating to the lobbying efforts of transnational business organizations in weakening 
antitrust law. This helped provide the preconditions for the dramatic expansion of corporate 
mergers and acquisitions that led to a reorganization of production. Corporations established 
lobbying networks coordinated by groups such as the Business Roundtable to lobby for the 
weakening of antitrust law. The corporate leaders of the Business Roundtable viewed M @ A 
strategies as one important tool to reverse the declining rate of corporate profits. By taking 
advantage of state policies that facilitated M @ A, corporations could potentially restructure their 
operations in a manner to make them more attractive to the financial sector. Institutional 
investors provided financing for firms that were willing to shed costly assets, including domestic 
infrastructure and jobs, in favor of concentrating on core activities that would then be 
complemented by a greater reliance on global supply chains to lower the costs of needed inputs. 
Business Mobilization and US Policy 
The structural economic crises facing the top 500 industrial corporations intensified 
during the 1970s and early 1980s. Increased global competition sliced into the market share of 
once privileged firms, whose debt levels steadily increased during this period, especially from 
1980 to 1984 when debt soured from 68.3% of equity to 81.4% (Prechel 1997: 414).  The 
problems were exacerbated by the previous strategies of US-based firms during the 1960s to 
solve the long-term accumulation crises by acquiring unrelated businesses in an attempt to 
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counter the beginning stages of declining rates of profit. The so-called third merger and 
acquisitions wave of the 1960s created large-scale conglomerates that were extremely top heavy, 
which over the long term added to the cost burdens of firms faced with greater global 
competition for markets in the 1970s and 1980s. By 1969, the share prices of US conglomerates 
dropped almost 50 percent from their previous high, including firms such as Litton, Gulf and 
Western, and Textron. In response to these trends, merger activity slowed dramatically during 
the 1970s, as corporations sought to concentrate on stabilizing a management structure that had 
to juggle complex product divisions which were all competing for resources. The efforts toward 
more effective management strategies failed, as reflected in a dramatic fall in the rate of profit 
during this period for the top 500 industrial firms from 7.7% from 1973 to 1981 to 4.8% from 
1982-1986 (Prechel, 1997: 414). 
In this context, US-based corporations increased their levels of political mobilization in 
an effort to shift US state policy in a more conservative direction. As numerous authors have 
documented, corporate political mobilization was achieved through an expansion of corporate 
think tanks and foundations, greater cooperation among business lobbying groups that had 
previously been more competitive, a dramatic infusion of lobbying dollars that proved pivotal in 
affecting legislation, and agenda-setting strategies that were reinforced by the rise of neoliberal 
ideology (Ferguson and Rogers 1984; Cox and Skidmore-Hess 1999; Jenkins and Eckert 2000). 
While the myth of the median voter persists in political science literature, the real politics of the 
right turn could be found in the intersection between the corporate boardroom and the political 
establishment.  Business policy organizations such as the moderately conservative Business 
Roundtable and the American Enterprise Institute, and the ultraconservatives associated with the 
US Chambers of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Hoover Institution 
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and the Heritage Foundation were influential in establishing the parameters of legislative options 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Akard 1992; Davis and Greve 1997; Jenkins and Eckert 
2000). 
The Business Roundtable, established in 1972, represented the most internationally 
competitive sectors of US business, and served as a kind of all-purpose political consulting 
organization to develop long-term strategic thinking for corporations faced with declining rates 
of profit (Burris, 1992; Dreiling 2000; Carroll, Carson 2003). Resting uneasily amidst a loose-
knit membership of top financial and manufacturing firms alongside emerging top retail 
corporations, the Roundtable could not always move forward with positions that would be 
acceptable to the entirety of its membership base. Nevertheless, the organization sought to 
develop a political strategy that would begin to counter the falling rate of profit that was faced by 
a wide cross-section of its corporate membership. This included weakening US labor laws, 
relaxing federal regulations, weakening antitrust provisions, and enabling corporate restructuring 
through favourable shifts in US tax laws. 
One of the first shots across the bow of effective business mobilization occurred in 1978, 
when the Business Roundtable, the US Chambers of Commerce and the National Association of 
Manufacturers put their muscle behind the Revenue Act of 1978, which  reduced the capital 
gains tax to 28% and locked in a 10% investment tax credit (Jenkins and Eckert 2000: 316-317). 
With the election of Ronald Reagan, conservative economic policies continued and expanded, 
including the Economic Recovery Tax Act, which in 1981 provided an increased depreciation 
allowance for fixed capital investments alongside a reduction in the progressivity of personal 
income taxes, amounting to the largest tax cut in history (Jenkins and Eckert 2000: 317). Initially 
supported by both the Business Roundtable and the Chambers of Commerce and NAM, within 
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two years the affects of this legislation divided the corporate lobbies. Wall Street interests were 
concerned about the inflationary impact of lower taxes, and the leading corporate foundations 
differed over the priorities that should drive legislation, with the conservative American 
Enterprise Institute favoring balanced budgets over supply side tax cuts, while the Heritage 
Foundation and the Hoover Institute favored a supply side strategy of tax cutting as the long-
term solution to all other problems. 
In this context of corporate political divisions, the Business Roundtable played a crucial 
role in advancing the interests of the most internationally competitive US corporations. First the 
Roundtable supported increased taxes as a strategy to help check inflation (and thereby a partial 
reversal of the ERTA), followed by lobbying efforts by the organization on behalf of 
Congressional legislation that would facilitate a more thoroughgoing corporate restructuring. The 
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was a Congressional response to the ongoing crises of 
business profitability, reflected in rising debt to equity ratios and an inability of firms to use 
lower capital gains taxes and greater depreciation allowances to reverse declining rates of profit. 
The 1986 Act “provided tax free mechanisms to transfer capital among parts of the corporate 
family” (Prechel, 1997: 17). Concretely, this provision allowed corporations to more easily shift 
their corporate structure from multidivisional forms (MDF) to multilayered subsidiary forms 
(MLSF). Corporations could replace divisions that were previously owned by the firm and 
managed by the central office with subsidiaries that would be legally independent of the 
corporation while still being financially controlled by the corporate parent.  This allowed 
corporations much greater flexibility in financing their operations due to the fact that divisions 
which were previously wholly owned by the firm were shifted to the status of subsidiary 
corporations that could raise money on their own through stock sales.   
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Thus the financialization of corporate profits was facilitated by changes in US tax law in 
1986, with the Business Roundtable leading the way in lobbying for the legislation. The shift in 
corporate structure from the MDF to the MLSF allowed corporations, at tax free rates, to 
restructure their operations by shedding legal responsibility for corporate divisions that were 
previously managed by the central office. This multilayered structure allowed for a greater 
reliance on stocks, as opposed to external financing from banks, to generate revenue for 
subsidiaries and greater options for the parent firm, who could then use stock revenue from their 
subsidiaries to retire corporate debt. The shift in corporate structure facilitated the global 
restructuring of the corporation, with the central office of the parent company establishing a far-
flung network of subsidiary firms that would produce a range of products at arms-length from 
the legal obligations of the parent corporation. With control over subsidiaries requiring only 50% 
plus one of financing, corporations could easily shift ties from subsidiaries to independent 
suppliers and contractors in an effort to further restructure the corporate form. This downsizing 
of corporate assets allowed firms to establish greater control over the high-valued added parts of 
the production process, increasingly centered around branding, marketing and distribution, while 
shifting the higher costs and riskier activities further down the supply chain.  
Such a restructuring strategy would not have been possible without the fourth wave of 
mergers in US history during the 1980s. This merger wave, unlike the conglomerate trend of the 
1960s, was characterized by firms purchasing firms in the same industry and downsizing other 
activities that were deemed peripheral to future profit streams. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
included a provision that allowed corporations to use their acquisitions of other firms to qualify 
for tax free status, as long as the acquisition “was in the same or a related product line as the 
existing business” (Prechel, 2000: 257). This law followed an extended period of reduced 
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enforcement of antitrust policy during the Reagan Administration.  Reagan’s Treasury Secretary, 
Attorney General, and Commerce Secretary supported an antitrust policy that would relax 
provisions of the Clayton Act which specified that mergers and acquisitions should be prohibited 
when “the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create 
monopoly” (Prechel, 2000: 257). Within this context, the Reagan Administration’s first antitrust 
chief in the Justice Department, William Baxter, “rewrote the antitrust guidelines to raise the 
level of market concentration that triggered a Justice Department challenge to conglomerate 
mergers, vertical combinations between suppliers and customers, and horizontal mergers 
between competitors” (Prechel 2000: 257). 
The mergers and acquisitions wave of the 1980s began a process of restructuring by US- 
based transnational firms that intensified during the 1990s and 2000s. With each passing decade, 
corporations have used favourable changes in US antitrust and tax laws to facilitate the 
establishment of global production networks which have been essential in efforts to attempt to 
stabilize profit rates after two decades of steady decline. Since 1986, US-based corporations have 
relied on imports from global supply chains for a steadily higher percentage of inputs in 
production. In the manufacturing sector alone, “offshoring intensity of material inputs reached 
14.5% in 2006, up from 11.6% in 1998, 6.2% in 1984 and 4.1% in 1974” (Milberg, 2010: 6).  
However, not all firms are created equal in their linkage to global value chains. Corporations 
involved in the production of electrical equipment, telecommunications, computer and electronic 
products, motor vehicles, transportation equipment and apparel were disproportionately involved 
in offshoring of material inputs. Firms in these sectors, by 2006, were relying on the offshoring 
of material inputs for as much as 20 to 25% of non-energy inputs used in their final product 
(Milberg and Winkler 2009: 281).  
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Aggregate numbers reveal a similar picture of a US economy that is much more firmly 
tied to offshoring and global supply chains than has been the case historically. By 2004, “52% of 
US imports were intra-firm” and “intermediaries accounted for 38% of US imports” (Milberg, 
2010: 6). A simulation model of US trade found that “vertical specialization—the sequential 
vertical trading chain stretching across many countries, with each country specializing in 
particular stages of a good’s production sequence—accounted for over 50% of the growth of US 
trade in the period 1962-1997” (Yi, 2003). One indication of the growth of “vertical 
specialization” is the increasing reliance, from 1986 to the present, by US transnational firms on 
imports of products from developing countries, whose imports to the US as a percentage of 
overall imports have steadily risen from 1986 to the present. In 1986, US imports from 
developing countries constituted about 36% of total US imports, while by 2006 this figure had 
reached 56%, reflecting a steady increase that reached 40% in 1990, and 45% in 1996 (Milberg 
2010: 425).   
US-based transnational firms have used a process of restructuring to expand reliance on 
subsidiaries, subcontractors, and foreign production networks to reduce costs and enhance profit 
margins. The US state shaped the initial stages of this strategy through favourable tax laws and 
easing of antitrust enforcement. Transnational corporations were able to shed costly corporate 
divisions at home in favour of a greater reliance on subsidiaries. The mergers and acquisitions 
wave of the 1980s was financed by leveraged buyouts, which facilitated a restructuring process 
that has been accelerating during the past two decades. During the 1990s, firms used stocks to 
finance further mergers and acquisitions, a process which further concentrated corporate 
ownership at the top of the global value chain. For example, measurements of corporate 
consolidation by industry reveal a steady increase in concentration of ownership in 
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telecommunications, information technology, electrical equipment, agribusiness, automobiles, 
retail and clothing, airlines, hotels, fast food and computer and electronics production.  
But the oligopoly structure does not mean corporate control of production from top to 
bottom. Instead, there is greater corporate consolidation at the top of the value chain, as 
corporations consolidate control in the US market over the most lucrative and value added 
aspects of production, especially design, branding, marketing and distribution of a finished 
product. The control of the top of the production structure gives corporations the ability to exert 
greater leverage over a widely dispersed supply network, which has increasingly shifted to parts 
of the developing world. The ability of US-based transnational firms to restructure their 
operations has been at least partially dependent on the actions of the US state in opening foreign 
markets to greater foreign trade and investment. Just as the US state has provided transnational 
firms with favourable changes in domestic tax and antitrust legislation, the US state has also 
been very important in negotiating reductions in trade and investment barriers with developing 
countries to facilitate the emergence of a global supply network. US corporate investment in 
foreign supply networks has been facilitated by greater access to foreign stock and bond markets, 
which has given US transnational firms the ability to link directly with foreign producers through 
the creation of subsidiaries or through minority shares in production networks dispersed across a 
range of locations and countries. A greater percentage of US corporate profits from the early 
1990s to 2006 have been directed to financial investments in stock and bond markets, including a 
rising percentage of these investments in the emerging markets of the developing world 
(Krippner 2005: 284-186). At the same time, corporations are paying out more revenues as 
dividend payments to shareholders, while reducing wages paid to US workers and while 
investing less in productive plant and equipment in the US (Serfati 2008:40-42). As I will 
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document in the remaining sections of this article, US state policy has provided an important 
nexus between US firms and the global supply networks that have been established in the 
developing markets of the global economy. 
Transnational Corporate Political Networks and Global Supply Chains 
During the 1980s to the present, US state policy has worked toward the liberalization of 
capital investment opportunities for US financial and non-financial firms in the developing 
world. The extent to which the US state has succeeded in advancing capital liberalization has 
largely depended on a wide range of factors, including the degree of political and economic ties 
between transnational political and economic elites in the US and the developing country, 
macroeconomic circumstances such as debt crises, and institutional factors particular to 
individual states that either facilitate or hinder the advancement and implementation of neoliberal 
projects favoured by the US. Here I will examine the emergence of transnational corporate 
political networks as vehicles for the restructuring of capital markets in developing countries. 
The pivot point for the establishment of these networks were domestic changes within the US 
corporation that have been discussed in the previous section, especially the shift from a corporate 
structure based on a multidivisional form to a multilayered subsidiary structure. This shift 
provided the basis for a political alliance between institutional financial investors that were 
becoming much more important within corporate boardrooms and non-financial firms that were 
committed to expanding production networks into the markets of developing countries. The 
hegemonic restructuring of developing markets, led by the US state and supported by US-based 
corporate interests, received additional political and economic support from an emerging 
transnational class within the developing world that was increasingly linked to global finance. In 
circumstances where these alliances were particularly strong, the greater the chances for the 
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advancement and implementation of neoliberal policies favouring the establishment of global 
supply networks, by way of relaxation of laws governing foreign direct investment and through 
expanded access to portfolio markets. 
The dramatic expansion of foreign access to capital markets in the developing world 
represented a significant structural feature of the shift to new methods of capital accumulation. 
William Robinson has captured the shift as one from Fordist production relationships based on 
national markets to globalized production networks dispersed across state borders (Robinson 
2004). This conception of the new globalization accentuates the characteristics associated with 
the most mobile sectors of capital, whose reorganization of the corporate form, described in the 
previous section, allowed for the most highly profitable production activities, centered around 
research and development, marketing, distribution and branding, to be disassembled from the 
other stages of production, increasingly dispersed across states and global markets and no longer 
owned or controlled directly by the parent firm.  This delinking of different stages of the 
production process is not entirely novel, but the degree to which the dispersal of component parts 
of the production process is scattered across a multiplicity of states has created both economic 
and political linkages that are unprecedented in scope and scale. 
The leading transnational firms that epitomize Robinson’s conception of a “Transnational 
Capitalist Class,” are most significantly correlated with particular sectors, and specifically the 
most competitive global corporations within those sectors, of global production, especially 
computers and electronics, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment, motor 
vehicles, media and entertainment, agribusiness and apparel. The growth and concentration of 
assets within global investment and commercial banking, as well as the emergence of a new 
category of institutional financial investors managing large-scale assets such as pensions and 
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mutual funds, etc., have developed in tandem with this emerging global production system. At 
the same time, the emergence of powerful retail corporations has helped to consolidate this new 
global production system, illustrated by Wal-Mart’s ability to use its tremendous market power 
to affect prices, wages and costs of production throughout key locations in the global supply 
chain. The reorganization of corporate structures in the US during the 1980s created deepening 
ties between institutional financial investors and non-financial corporations, who relied much 
more on stocks and the ownership of financial assets to consolidate their position in global 
markets during the merger and acquisition waves of the 1990s.  
In the US, transnational corporations who were most aligned with these newly emerging 
production structures, lobbied the US state to change tax laws in ways that facilitated corporate 
restructuring. This was also true in US foreign economic policy, where political organizations 
led by the Business Roundtable became vehicles for promoting the liberalization of capital 
markets, policies which benefitted globally competitive US-based financial interests as well as 
non-financial corporations who sought to increase reliance on foreign markets for the production 
of intermediate goods and component inputs that would be designed, branded and distributed by 
the parent firm. The liberalization of foreign stock and bond markets helped to connect producers 
of intermediate goods in the developing world to supply chains that extended back to the US and 
other developed country markets. Transnational firms would link with foreign producers, either 
in the form of joint ventures, subsidiaries or independent contractors, to produce products 
incorporating the technological specifications and packaging required by the parent firm. Foreign 
producers at the higher end of the production chain could raise money for their costs of doing 
business by tapping newly emerging domestic stock markets, which could be financed in part by 
global institutional investors as well as domestic financiers who wanted to realize profits from 
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the newly emerging transnational production networks. Other foreign producers, at the lower end 
of the production chain and not capital-intensive enough to enter domestic stock exchanges, 
would produce component parts at cheap costs at the bottom of the supply chain, with an 
overwhelming dependence on cheap labor to realize the slimmest of profit margins.   
A political model of corporate influence in US foreign policy can be linked to the 
position of corporations along the global supply chain. US-based transnational firms at the top of 
the supply chain have the strongest representation within the Business Roundtable, arguably the 
most influential corporate political organization in US foreign policymaking—especially US 
foreign economic policy and trade policy. In the negotiations that provided the legal framework 
for NAFTA, the membership of the Roundtable overlapped with the trade advisory committee 
established by the US Special Trade Representative to negotiate the details of the agreement. 
Corporate sectors that were disproportionately represented in the negotiation were those sectors 
most involved in a global restructuring of production, including industrial and consumer 
electronics, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, computers, agribusiness, auto manufacturers, 
and the most globally competitive textile and apparel manufacturers (Chase 2005). US retail 
corporations and the leading commercial and investment banks also supported the agreement. 
The opening of the Mexican financial markets allowed US-based institutional investors holding 
mutual, pension and insurance funds to tap into the Mexican market as a condition for the 
restructuring of Mexican debt. At the same time, the privatization of Mexican state-owned 
industry provided opportunities for the expansion of supply networks linking US transnational 
corporations to subcontractors in the Mexican market. This was especially true in auto parts and 
electronics produced in the maquiladora sector. This sector has expanded rapidly after the 
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passage of NAFTA, alongside other manufacturing sectors that are closely linked to intermediary 
trade in US global value chains (Yang 1998).  
The US state played a significant role in establishing the political conditions necessary 
for a greater consolidation of supply networks in Mexico. A 1982 change in US banking 
regulations, The Export Trading Company Act, allowed commercial banks to invest directly in 
import-export firms as part of their foreign operations. In addition, there were further changes in 
US banking regulations due to a relaxation of Federal Reserve requirements that allowed 
commercial banks to gradually expand the percentage of their capital investments in stock and 
bond markets (Bhargava, Fraser 1998) . Finally, the Brady Plan of 1989 allowed Mexico to 
finance some of its debt by a “debt for equity” swap in which commercial banks could purchase 
equity stakes in shares of Mexico’s newly privatized firms as a substitute for outright repayment 
of debt obligations. The privatization of Mexican firms during the 1980s helped create a 
transnational political coalition that linked US-based financial corporations—in commercial and 
investment banking as well as institutional investors—to a newly emerging Mexican supply 
network that was increasingly owned by a relatively small number of Mexico’s wealthiest 
financial investors.  Represented politically by the Mexican Businessman’s Council, the largest 
37 Mexican firms dominated the privatization of state assets, accounting for 80 percent of the 
value of all privatizations between 1982 and 1991 (Moody 1995: 101). The Business Roundtable 
and the US Chambers of Commerce worked closely with Mexican investors to support 
privatization initiatives during the 1980s that became institutionalized with the passage of 
NAFTA.  
In the case of Mexico, a transnational political coalition could emerge more easily than 
was possible in other contexts due to the historical ties between US capital and Mexican capital, 
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especially in the Maquiladora sector, which had been established as a legal arrangement in the 
1960s, and in agribusiness, which large-scale Mexican firms and financial interests were already 
deeply connected to US agribusiness firms in the purchase of machinery, fertilizer and trade 
relationships. This process was connected to the ongoing transformation of global agriculture 
toward more elaborate supply chains that linked to food processing, marketing and distribution 
networks dominated by large-scale US agribusiness corporations, and structured in important 
ways by the rising power of corporate supermarket retail chains (Spieldoch 2010).  
The Centrality of Finance in Global Restructuring 
The financial sector had seen the largest growth in profit margins since the shift toward a 
“shareholder governance model” during the 1980s. Non-financial firms have become steadily 
more dependent on investments in the financial sector, including stock buybacks and dividend 
payments, which have displaced long-term capital investment in plants and equipment. This 
process has created, at times, a surge of wealth from financial speculation, but at the expense of 
long-term (and more stable) investments in capital equipment that can produce jobs. The short-
term imperatives of keeping institutional investors satisfied has meant a greater reliance on 
financial investments that have high short-term rewards but greater long-term risks.  
Furthermore, an emphasis on short-term growth has served to crowd out investment in real 
capital, as a detailed econometric study of investment patterns by non-financial firms has 
demonstrated (Yi 2003). 
Non-financial corporations, driven by pressures from institutional investors for high stock 
valuations, and having shed productive capital assets in favour of a greater reliance on branding, 
marketing and distribution of a product at the top end of the value chain, have steadily expanded 
their reliance on portfolio investments in global markets, a further indication of the 
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financialization of production. This trend is indicated by statistics on foreign direct investment 
from the late 1980s through the late 1990s, when the composition of foreign direct investment 
shifted disproportionately to portfolio financing (Haley 2001: 18). In other words, transnational 
corporations involved in global supply networks are increasingly relying on institutional 
investors to finance those supply networks through portfolio funds and bond issues. Normally, 
when foreign direct investment increases, as it has during the 1980s and 1990s, there is a 
decrease in bond financing. This is because foreign direct investors have traditionally funded 
large infrastructure projects as part of their foreign investment expenditures. Therefore, those 
projects have typically been less reliant on financing through bond or portfolio markets. 
However, the trends of the 1980s and 1990s defied this historical pattern: FDI financing has 
depended much more on bond and portfolio financing than it has in the past. This has meant a 
much more central role for institutional investors, whose financing of FDI has been important in 
establishing the linkage between transnational corporations at the top of the global supply chain 
and the supply networks based in emerging markets in the developing world (Haley 2001: 24-
43).  
The increased importance of institutional investors as a nexus between transnational 
corporations and global supply chains is a crucial component of the new financialization of 
production. By the middle of the 1990s, there was good evidence that emerging market fund 
managers controlled as much as 55 percent of portfolio flows to emerging markets in the 
developing world (Haley, 2001: 33). This category of fund managers is dominated by 
institutional investors that manage mutual funds, pension funds, investments of insurance 
companies, banks, brokerage firms, and large multinational corporations. The Reuters database 
that track these funds indicated “only 56 funds that fall into the category of emerging market 
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funds in the US and Europe” (Haley, 2001: 34). Furthermore, “within this fund universe, five 
institutional investors hold 72 percent of these assets” (Haley, 2001: 35). The concentration of 
these funds among just five institutional investors provides a starting point for understanding the 
political and economic power of institutional investors in the new global production system.  
Institutional investors exist because of the increased importance of global portfolio 
investments to the bottom line of financial and non-financial corporations alike. The increasingly 
competitive world of global capitalism has led the most global and competitive transnational 
corporations to restructure their operations around financial investment allocations that are tied 
to assessments of foreign portfolio markets. Institutional investors that manage large-scale 
financial assets are important political and market mediators for transnational corporations 
looking to expand supply networks into emerging markets. The Clinton Administration tied 
much of its foreign economic strategy during the 1990s to prying open portfolio markets to 
access by US-based institutional investors. This has been elaborated most fully by the work of  
Peter Gowan, who has noted the geopolitics associated with US efforts to offer both “carrots and 
sticks” to developing countries in exchange for liberalization of capital markets, a process that 
contributed to the Asian financial crisis of 1997.  
The rush to liberalize capital markets as a US-IMF “solution” to economic crises in the 
developing world is the essence of the turn to neoliberalism from the 1980s through the early 
2000s. That political turn has been over-determined by a constellation of actors at the top of the 
corporate pyramid whose profit margins have been much more firmly tied to an accumulation of 
financial assets than was the case prior to the mid-1980s. This is true for non-financial firms 
increasingly tied to investment strategies that are at least partly the product of an ascendancy of 
institutional investors as powerful shareholders within the corporate boardroom. In addition, 
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non-financial corporations at the top of increasingly elaborate global supply chains look to 
institutional investors to manage the monetary investments of the firm, which are increasingly 
diversified in an array of global portfolio products. Non-financial corporations use a variety of 
mechanisms, including currency speculation and hedge funds, to help manage risks associated 
with rising portfolio investors.  And they also utilize external signals from a relatively small 
number of top institutional investors to decide whether or not to invest in particular emerging 
markets, or to pull out investments if political and market signals are problematic.   
The ability of commercial and investment banks to merge operations and to engage in a 
higher percentage of risky proprietary investments has been politically possible due to a steady 
increase of political influence by the financial sector on US economic policy—both domestic and 
foreign.  The easing of restrictions placed on the ability of commercial banks to use depositors’ 
money to engage in stock and bond investments did not materialize with the elimination of the 
Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. Instead, as early as the 1980s, changes in US trade law allowed US 
commercial banks to invest in export-import companies in foreign markets, a policy that helped 
contribute to the establishment of supply linkages between US parent corporations and their 
emerging foreign subsidiaries and subcontractors. By the late 1980s, the US Federal Reserve 
began a process of easing the regulations that limited commercial banks’ investment in capital 
assets. The debt crisis faced by developing countries during the 1980s further embedded 
financial institutions, including commercial banks, investment banks and institutional investors, 
in the purchase of newly privatized assets in countries such as Mexico, where newly emerging 
Mexican financial groups worked closely with US money managers to take advantage of the 
profits of privatization. 
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As a former member of the board of the directors of the IMF has recently commented, the 
US political system, and much of its foreign policy apparatus, suffers from the same ailment that 
the IMF has identified in developing countries:  state capture by a financial oligarchy that has 
such a hold on state policy that it most powerful members have been the recipients of the largest 
financial bailout in US history—on terms highly favourable to the profit margins of the biggest 
financial holding corporations left standing (Johnson 2009). The politics of these financial 
relationships have been well-documented elsewhere. What is most striking is how deeply 
embedded the rest of the US economy has become on the financialization of assets in lieu of 
productive investments in capital necessary to create jobs for the US working class. In the midst 
of this current capitalist crisis, the profit margins of non-financial and financial corporations have 
risen over the past two years, in direct contrast with the wages of US workers—which have 
fallen. These statistics are directly related to a playing field that has been politically stacked 
against the working class for some time, both here and abroad. That there appears to be no 
political appetite for redressing this balance is a testament to the enduring political strength of 
the transnational corporate network in US and global politics, and the lack of an effective 
counterweight to their agenda. 
Transnational Interest Blocs and Business Conflict 
 The implications of this research for analysis of corporate interests and US foreign policy 
is that a transnational interest bloc located at the top of global supply chains has established a 
disproportionate influence over US foreign economic policy.  Represented by business 
associations led by the Business Roundtable, this transnational interest bloc is characterized by 
its location at the top of the supply chain pyramid.  High-tech firms are well-represented, with 
“system integrator” firms having established overwhelming control of the high value added 
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aspects of the global computer and software markets.  After the previous two decades of mergers 
and acquisitions, a handful of brand-name manufacturers have consolidated their positions at the 
top of global supply chains across numerous sectors of the global economy.  In addition, retail 
firms occupy an important strategic space in this framework, with their ability to utilize just-in-
time delivery systems to force costs down the supply chain toward primary producers.  And, as 
noted in the previous section, institutional financial investors, with their capacity to move money 
rapidly across an increasingly deregulated financial landscape, have emerged as central players 
in the financing of global supply chain networks. 
 Together these entities constitute a “system integrator” transnational interest bloc which 
has affected US foreign policy through lobbying networks that have shaped the content of 
foreign trade and investment agreements.  However, this bloc of interests, due to their diverse 
positions within the global supply chains and their shifting linkages with other actors occupying 
different positions within supply chain networks, cannot always achieve unity on policy 
positions.  For example, corporate sectors in the high-tech industry who now focus entirely on 
activities at the top of the global supply chain, including patent ownership, research and 
development, marketing and distribution, have typically pushed for the most aggressive 
liberalization of foreign markets in order to facilitate unhindered access (at the lowest cost) to 
potential supply networks.  Manufacturing interests that still have a stake in ownership of 
production activities often prefer quasi-protectionist clauses in regional trade agreements that 
allow them time to adjust to the costs of integrating production within regional markets ahead of 
potential competitors.  
 To summarize, what I term a transnational interest bloc has four fundamental features 
that can be captured through a content analysis of trade and investment agreements negotiated by 
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the US state in combination with sectors of transnational capital located within different 
positions in global supply networks (Cox, 2008).  First, this transnational interest bloc is led by 
transnational firms based in the market economies of the US, the EU and Japan, and linked to 
policymakers through business networks and associations that are uniquely privileged to 
influence regional and global trade and investment agreements. In the US, these transnational 
firms are represented most prominently by the Business Roundtable, the International Chambers 
of Commerce, the Americas Business Council and numerous sectoral associations, and are linked 
to the trade negotiation process through the Office of the US Trade Representative’s Trade 
Advisory Committees.  
 Second, firms and sectors of transnational capital connected to policymakers in the US, 
the EU and Japan, have both common and conflicting goals, depending on their position within 
the world economy. In the cases of NAFTA and DR-CAFTA, some sectors linked to US 
policymakers pushed for policies that discriminated against firms whose investments were based 
outside of North America and CentralAmerica-DominicanRepublic. Other sectors supported a 
wide liberalization of investment, trade, regulatory and property rights protections in NAFTA 
and DR-CAFTA that provided equal market access to all foreign investors. Similarly, 
transnational capital based in the EU and Japan have pursued alternative versions of a Singapore 
agenda within the WTO that suggests goals that are partly complementary and partly distinct 
from their US-based counterparts. 
 The third feature is the linkage between business associations, government bureaucracies 
and ministries in the developing world and transnational firms based in the developed market 
economies of the US, the EU and Japan.  For example, the structural shifts in the process of 
globalization during the 1980s provided the basis for greater political cooperation between US-
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based transnational capital and firms and government bureaucracies and ministries in Mexico 
and the Caribbean Basin that were crucial in building support for NAFTA and DR-CAFTA.  
These relationships have been important in negotiating the political frameworks for the 
expansion of supply chains and investment networks that extend from the US to developing 
countries.  
 Fourth, in the cases of NAFTA and DR-CAFTA, the power relationships and institutional 
structures of each member state’s political system provide the context for understanding how and 
to what extent a particular transnational interest bloc is able to advance their policy preferences. 
In the cases of NAFTA and DR-CAFTA, the market size of the US allowed state negotiators and 
US-based transnational capital significant advantages in crafting the final policy outlines of trade 
and investment agreements signed with poorer countries. The ascendancy of neoliberal ideology 
among state bureaucrats in Mexico, Central America and the Dominican Republic, reinforced by 
growing ties between state actors and transnational capital, has also facilitated ratification of 
these agreements. The role of the US state and US-based transnational business organizations in 
promoting NAFTA and DR-CAFTA is part of a broader strategy of utilizing regional trade and 
investment agreements to secure policies that go beyond what is currently allowed in multilateral 
forums such as the WTO. 
 The ability of “system integrator” firms to capture the majority of profits and wealth 
connected to global supply chains is contested by rival firms located at different positions along 
the supply chain.  At the same time, the contradictions of neoliberal trade and investment 
agreements are being expressed politically with the growth of populist states in Latin America, 
and the emergence of NGO movements with ties to labor and environmental groups that are 
sometimes able to negotiate more favourable terms for the distribution of profits toward lower 
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levels of the supply chain.  As such, the political conflicts over the distribution of supply chain 
benefits are likely be one of the key issues for students of world politics to address in the near 
future.  I hope this journal and the scholarly contributions presented here can make a significant 
contribution to this effort. 
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